23 Dec 2025
Introduction
Nigeria's public finance system is based on the principle of annual budgeting, demonstrating a commitment to fiscal predictability and legislative oversight. Nigeria's budgetary process is enshrined in Chapter V, Part I of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which mandates the President to prepare and present an Appropriation Bill to the National Assembly for approval. The Appropriation Act serves as the core legal foundation of Nigeria's annual budget, authorizing expenditures from the Consolidated Revenue Fund for a specific financial year, being any period of twelve months beginning with the first day of January in any year or such other period as may be prescribed by the National Assembly, as defined by section 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). This is reinforced by the Financial Year Act (Cap. F20, LFN 2004), which standardizes it as January 1 to December 31. However, persistent delays in budget preparation, passage, and implementation have necessitated legislative extensions of these Acts beyond their statutory timelines, raising questions regarding constitutional validity, fiscal discipline, and governance implications.
This practice, while pragmatic, intersects with core constitutional tenets under Sections 80-83 of the 1999 Constitution, which mandate legislative authorization for public spending. Recent instances, such as the extension of the 2020 Appropriation Act amid COVID-19 disruptions and the 2024 Act's rollover to 2025, underscore a pattern of fiscal improvisation.
This paper examines whether such extensions, commonly manifested through budget rollovers and supplementary appropriations, are legally valid under Nigeria's constitutional framework. It also raises fundamental questions about fiscal discipline, parliamentary oversight, and adherence to constitutional provisions by analyzing the constitutional framework governing appropriations, examining comparative practices, and evaluating the positive and negative impacts of such extensions on Nigeria's fiscal governance.
Historical Context and Practice of Extensions
Nigeria has experienced persistent budget implementation challenges, with appropriation acts frequently passed months into the fiscal year. The 2016 Appropriation Act, for instance, was not signed until May 6, 2016, five months into the fiscal year. The 2018 budget was signed in June 2018. These delays have created practical pressures for informal budget extensions. A salient historical precedent is the extension of the 2020 Appropriation Act into 2021, which was necessitated by the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic and facilitated the seamless continuation of expenditures in health and infrastructure sectors. More recently, the 2025 Appropriation Act was assented to by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu on February 28, 2025, marking the enactment of a N54.99 trillion fiscal blueprint amid ongoing implementation challenges from prior cycles. However, this marks a consolidation of dual-budget operations, with the 2025 Act running concurrently. On June 24, 2025, the Senate acceded to the President's request for a second extension of the 2024 Appropriation Act, specifically its capital component, prolonging its validity until December 31, 2025. This measure follows an initial extension granted in December 2024 to June 30, 2025. This development exemplifies a trend of concurrent budgetary operations, underscoring the normalization of fiscal carryovers in Nigeria's public finance regime.
Constitutional and Legal Framework for Appropriations in Nigeria
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) establishes the fundamental principles governing appropriations. Section 80(1) provides that "all revenues or other moneys raised or received by the Federation (not being revenues or other moneys payable under this Constitution or any Act of the National Assembly into any other public fund of the Federation established for a specific purpose) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation."
Section 80(2) states categorically that "no moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the fund by this Constitution or where the issue of those moneys has been authorized by an Appropriation Act, Supplementary Appropriation Act or Act of the National Assembly passed in pursuance of section 81 of this Constitution."
Section 81(1) mandates that "the President shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National Assembly at any time in each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the Federation for the next following financial year." Section 81(4) further stipulates that "if in respect of any financial year it is found that the amount appropriated by the Appropriation Act for any purpose is insufficient or that a need has arisen for expenditure for a purpose for which no amount has been appropriated by that Act, a supplementary estimate showing the sums required or a statement of excess shall be laid before each House of the National Assembly." Section 82 provides that where the Appropriation Bill in respect of any financial year has not been passed into law by the beginning of the financial year, the President may authorize withdrawals for a period not exceeding six months or until the coming into operation of the Appropriation Act, capped at the prior year's proportionate amount. This "vote on account" mechanism ensures governmental continuity but is temporally limited. At the state level, similar provisions are contained in sections 120-123.
Accordingly, the Fiscal Responsibility Act provides an additional regulatory framework for public financial management. The Fiscal Responsibility Act (2007) supplements these constitutional rules by emphasizing prudent fiscal management, macroeconomic stability, and accountability. The Act establishes the Financial Reporting Commission to enforce compliance and introduces mechanisms like the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) as the basis for annual budgets.
Assessing Legal Validity
The legal framework governing Nigeria’s public finance, comprising the 1999 Constitution (as amended) and the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007, is structured on the presumption that an Appropriation Act is intended to authorize revenue and expenditure for a single, clearly delineated financial year (1 January to 31 December). This delimitation serves as a core element of fiscal discipline, ensuring annual legislative scrutiny, preventing indefinite carry-overs, and aligning public spending with evolving economic realities. Nevertheless, neither the Constitution nor the Act contains an express prohibition against the legislative extension of an Appropriation Act beyond the financial year for which it was originally enacted. The absence of such a prohibition has permitted the National Assembly, acting under its plenary legislative powers, to authorize extensions through resolutions or supplementary appropriation legislation when implementation lags threaten the completion of critical projects.
The statutory vacuum in Nigeria’s constitutional budget architecture lies in the deliberate flexibility granted to the Executive under Section 81(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The provision mandates that: “The President shall cause to be prepared and laid before each House of the National Assembly at any time in each financial year estimates of the revenues and expenditure of the Federation for the next following financial year.” The phrase “at any time in each financial year” seemingly grants the President unfettered discretion regarding the timing of budget presentation. Unlike comparable jurisdictions, such as Ghana (section 179(1) requiring presentation not later than one month before the end of the financial year) or Kenya (section 221(1) requiring submission at least two months before the end of each financial year), the Nigerian Constitution imposes no mandatory statutory deadline. This conspicuous lacuna is the most significant driver of perennial budget delays.
Compounding this further is the absence of any express constitutional or statutory prohibition on extending an Appropriation Act beyond the financial year for which it was originally enacted. Section 82, which authorizes provisional spending for up to six months (or longer with National Assembly approval) if the Appropriation Bill for the following year has not been passed before the commencement of the financial year, demonstrates that the framers contemplated transitional fiscal arrangements. By implication, where the National Assembly, in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers under Section 4(2) and its exclusive authority over appropriation under Section 80(2)-(4), elects to enact a statute or supplementary appropriation extending the validity of capital votes or the entire Act, no explicit constitutional provision is violated.
The cumulative effect of these constitutional silences constitutes a dangerous statutory vacuum. The absence of a mandatory latest date for the President’s submission of the Appropriation Bill, a prohibition on repetitive or indefinite extensions of prior-year appropriations, and clear consequences for systematic non-compliance have normalized a governance culture in which the executive routinely presents budgets as late as November or December while the legislature, at the request of the President, extends Appropriation Act of the previous year repetitively. This practice effectively transforms the constitutionally contemplated annual appropriation cycle into a de facto rolling or biennial appropriation regime.
Nigerian constitutional jurisprudence has, in exceptional circumstances, invoked the doctrine of necessity to justify temporary departures from strict compliance where such rigid adherence would occasion governance paralysis, as affirmed in Lakanmi v. Attorney-General (Western Nigeria) and reiterated in Attorney-General of Abia State v. Attorney-General of the Federation. While some commentators have sought to extend this principle to recurrent appropriation extensions, characterizing budgetary delays as a species of fiscal emergency, the doctrine’s applicability remains untested in this context, as no court of competent jurisdiction has endorsed its deployment to legitimize extended Appropriation Acts beyond the financial year.
Consequently, the legal validity of extensions rests solely on the prevailing construction of Sections 80–82 and 318(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). The extensions enacted through a duly passed Supplementary Appropriation Act or a validly adopted resolution of both Houses of the National Assembly exercising their plenary legislative powers under Section 4(2) are constitutionally permissible.
Governance Implications of Budget Extensions
Positive Implications:
- Dual budgets enable resource optimization, reduce lapsing funds waste, and enhance value-for-money in a resource-scarce economy.
- Extensions prevent disruptive government shutdowns, ensuring the continuous delivery of essential services, including security, healthcare, education, and infrastructure maintenance.
- Abrupt cessation of government expenditure would trigger severe economic disruptions, affecting contractors, suppliers, government employees, and dependent sectors. Extensions maintain financial stability and prevent cascading failures across the economy.
- Nigeria's international obligations, debt servicing, treaty commitments, and dues to international organization require continuous funding. Extensions prevent defaults that would damage Nigeria's global standing and creditworthiness.
- When political conflicts delay budget passage, extensions provide a pragmatic buffer, preventing legislative dysfunction from paralyzing governance.
Negative Implications:
- Frequent rollovers (as in the cases of the 2023 & 2024) disincentivize timely budgeting, perpetuating a culture of dual appropriations and inflating debt via Ways and Means advances.
- Blurred audit trails complicate oversight, enabling padding and corruption, as unexpended balances invite misuse.
- Delays signal instability to investors, exacerbating inflation, unemployment, and growth stagnation. Transparency suffers, with procurement bottlenecks amplifying inefficiencies.
- Extensions diminish parliamentary power over the purse, transforming the legislature from appropriation authority to retrospective validator. This fundamentally alters constitutional power balances, concentrating fiscal power in the executive.
- Extensions create moral hazard, reducing incentives for budget discipline, timely passage, and efficient implementation. Governments can operate informally, knowing that expenditure will be retrospectively regularized, encouraging fiscal recklessness.
- Normalizing constitutional deviation in appropriation matters establishes precedents for similar deviations in other constitutional domains, gradually eroding constitutional governance standards.
Conclusion
Nigeria stands at a constitutional crossroads: the 1999 Constitution, as presently framed, quietly allows the extension of Appropriation Acts beyond the financial year because it neither expressly forbids it nor imposes iron-clad deadlines on the budget cycle. On the one hand, the Constitution says every Appropriation Act applies to a specific financial year, and money can only be spent if the Legislature has approved it for that year. On the other hand, Nigeria’s budgets are often passed late, and many projects cannot be completed within 12 months. Hence, while the strict reading of the Constitution says one-year, practical reality and the Legislature’s law-making power have created a workable exception. While experts say it is not the best way to run the country’s finances, the practical realities of governance continuity, the doctrine of necessity, and historical practice present countervailing considerations.
The proper resolution lies not in normalizing extensions but in addressing the systemic causes of appropriation delays through constitutional and institutional reforms. Interestingly, there is a bill currently being considered in the House of Representatives titled “A Bill for An Act to Alter the Constitution of The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 To Specify the Period for The Laying of Annual Budget Estimates Before the National and State Houses of Assemblies and for Related Matters” (HB. 1694), sponsored by Hon. Emeka Martins Chinedu. The Bill seeks to alter sections 81 and 121 of the Constitution to specify the period during which national and state budgets shall be laid before the National and State Houses of Assemblies (at least 60 days before the end of the preceding financial year). By instituting a fixed deadline for budget presentations, the bill seeks to achieve several important objectives, but most importantly, to establish a specific date for budget submission to compel the executive branch to prepare and submit its budget earlier and ensure timely consideration and approval of budgets before the commencement of the new financial year.
Until the proposed constitutional amendment is enacted and the reforms are fully operationalized, the recurrent extension of Appropriation Acts beyond the statutory financial year will remain entrenched in Nigeria’s fiscal governance. The question now confronting the National Assembly transcends the narrow legal permissibility of such extensions. Rather, the decisive issue is whether Nigeria is prepared to transition from a system that perpetually accommodates delay to one that institutionalizes discipline and accountability in public financial management.
END NOTES
[1] Section 81 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
2 Section 80 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).
3 K Akintoye, ‘Full Text: President Buhari’s Speech at 2016 Budget Signing’ (Channels Television6 May 2016) <https://www.channelstv.com/2016/05/06/full-text-president-buharis-speech-2016-budget-signing/> accessed 29 November 2025.
4 Research Team, ‘This Is Nigeria’s 2018 Budget Breakdown’ (Nairametrics21 June 2018) <https://nairametrics.com/2018/06/21/nigerias-2018-federal-budget-appropriation-bill-breakdown/> accessed 29 November 2025.
5 Olalekan Adigun, ‘Tinubu Signs N54.9 Trillion 2025 Budget into Law’ (Nairametrics28 February 2025) <https://nairametrics.com/2025/02/28/tinubu-signs-n54-9-trillion-2025-budget-into-law/> accessed 29 November 2025.
6 Modupe Gbadeyanka, ‘Senate Extends Capital Component of 2024 Budget to December 2025’ (Business Post Nigeria24 June 2025) <https://businesspost.ng/economy/senate-extends-capital-component-of-2024-budget-to-december-2025/> accessed 29 November 2025.
7 Ibid.
8 Section 2 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007.
9 Section 11 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007.
10(1971) 1 All NLR 38
11(2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 764) 542. 9 Section 11 of the Fiscal Responsibility Act, 2007.7 Ibid.
William Umoh is the Legislative Reform Analyst, Ernest Shonekan Centre